伊朗国王的梦想：原子弹

伤我心太深

作者：阿巴斯·米拉尼*

发表日期：2010. 12. 29.

三十多年前，还没有伊朗共和国的时候，西方拼了老命想要阻止伊朗的当政者染指原子弹。新兴的革命运动恰恰显示了那场危机有多么严重——以及美国的去核化为何不能奏效。

伊朗核谈判的众多拎不清、道不明的因素里，最为顽固的莫过于一项主张，即出于对伊朗共和国的核项目的最终目标的质疑，西方国家企图强制推行一个双重的标准。根据这个标准，伊朗最后一个国王穆罕默德·礼萨·巴列维是西方的盟友——或按现政权的说法，是“狗腿子”——因此美国和欧洲都迫不及待地要向他提供帮助的不是一个，而是很多的反应堆。但自从1979年伊朗共和国成立以来，这些吹毛求疵的家伙说伊朗要被排除在外而且要被制裁。2006年，伊朗总统马哈茂德·艾哈迈德内贾德向德国《明镜周刊
Der Spiegel》发表谈话说“有趣的是欧洲国家想要允许国王的独裁政权使用核技术......而且那些国家还要给它提供核技术支持。而自从建立了伊斯兰共和国以来，这些国家就开始反对它。”甚至西方的一些开明知识分子也都相信了这个说法，他们要么支持现政权的项目，要么就因为美国过去给国王开出过许可，至少批评了美国对艾哈迈德内贾德当前项目所持的立场是虚伪的。而美国政府本身，基于这个必须被认为是公开外交上说不清道不明的失败，也从来不挑战这个说法——尽管它用了好几百张纸的文件来加以反驳。
事实上，华盛顿卷入了一场就其核子发展计划的目的与前国王进行的旷日持久、频繁的幕后外交缠斗。最近解密、来自卡特总统图书馆、福特总统图书馆、国防部、能源部、国务院以及国家安全委员会的文件显示，造成今日政府与伊斯兰共和国之间僵持的每一个要素在与国王进行谈判时都已存在。这些范围包括了从伊朗主张其核不扩散条约下的权利到它“完整的能源圈”，它抱怨美国单向伊朗要求提供、而其他国家不用提供的保证，乃至美国承诺要使伊朗部分加入国际财团以在其境外进行铀浓缩的所谓的“俄罗斯方案”。国王一再坚持说他连一颗核弹都不要——但他坚称伊朗不能被视作二等公民。这些谈判，其细节至今尚未揭晓，它们并不只是揭露伊朗现政权所谓的美国的双重标准的谎言，也真假参半地给西方谈判者提供了在伊朗民族主义的水域里航行的有用的指南。
伊朗的核计划始于作为美国总统德怀特·D.·艾森豪威尔1953年12月宣布的“和平使用原子能”计划的一部分、由美国于1959年赠送德黑兰大学的一个小型反应堆。但此举仅刺激了伊朗君主的核胃口：随着他石油税入的增长，随着他对伊朗地区霸权的新愿景，核计划便成了巴列维国王进步和权力的象征。1973年，他在宫廷召见了训练有素的核物理学家阿克巴尔·艾特马，和他谈了自己开展一个核计划的愿望，并要求艾特马制定一个总体规划。
两个星期之后，国王又召见了艾特马。他快速阅读了艾特马起草的13页文件，然后命令首相拨了一笔后来证实是他在位期间最大的拨款资助这个项目。事先并没有拿到设立了财源支配的宪法权力的伊朗议会去讨论，也未经任何政府部门或委员会讨论。就像当时每一个重大决策那样，这是个个人决定。伊朗的核计划就是这样开始了。
国王的计划要求一个“功能齐全的核能工业”，具备23000兆瓦的发电能力。到1977年，伊朗原子能组织(AEOI) 的员工超过了1500人（根据国王的命令，允许他们成为工资最高的政府雇员）。巴列维安排了伊朗核专家到世界各地的培训（包括了对麻省理工学院2千万美元的资助），对伊朗以及全球的铀矿进行了彻底的研究，而且在国内遍设原子研究中心。伊朗原子能组织在当时是政府资助的最大项目。1976年，其预算为13亿美元，从而成为排在该国的石油公司之后最大的单一的政府所有的经济单位。
在德国和法国迫不及待地要向伊朗兜售反应堆的时候，美国政府的初始态度是勉强的，据美国政府的一份备忘说，“没有条件限制（伊朗国王的）行动自由。”德国公司克拉夫特维克（意为发电站）签下了第一份协议建造现在已出名的布什尔反应堆，初步定在1981年完工，估计造价为30亿美元。由于布什尔处在地震频仍的危险地带，又另行拨款防止工地受地震威胁。据说当时德国急于在伊朗市场找一个立脚点，它要保证克拉夫特维克的投资万无一失。而反观美国的公司，在美国政府提出有关国王的目的关切解决之前，是不准签这样的合同的。
国王坚持伊朗应该享有它“全部的权利”，国王这样说的时候，恰逢伊朗签署了在核不扩散条约框架内的一份协议之后，该协议规定并要求非核国家不得从事核弹的研究，并以降低和平利用原子能的门槛作为交换。但是伊朗不但坚持有获得完整的能源圈的权力，它也有兴趣进行鈈加工——那是一种比浓缩铀更快的制造核弹的途径。
作为对今天艾哈迈德内贾德挑衅的回应，1974年2月，在法国-伊朗签署了浓缩铀的合作协议之后，国王告诉法国世界报说，终有一日，“比想象得要快”，伊朗就会“拥有一枚核弹”。国王这语出惊人的言论至少在某种程度上是针对1974年印度进行的核武实验作出的反应。
意识到自己言论的反响，国王命令伊朗驻法国大使馆发表一个声明，说他计划制造一枚核弹的说法“纯属捏造而且没有任何根据”。美国驻德黑兰的大使馆转达了国王的信息，并且再度向国务院保证，说他“当然还未”打算离开核不扩散条约或加入核俱乐部。
但根据他与美国大使谈话的文字记录，甚至在他努力就自己的意图取信华盛顿的时候，国王也指出，只要本地区任何一个国家发展核武器，那么“任何其他国家的国家利益也有可能要求自己做同样的事。”伊朗国王的宫廷大臣阿萨多拉尔·阿拉姆在他从上世纪70年代早期到去世之前的日记里不止一次说到，根据他的观察，国王“想要核弹”，但作为当时的权宜之计坚决地予以否认。
根据当时国防、能源部门的备忘录，美国特别担忧的是“根据伊朗的23000兆瓦核能计划得出的鈈的年产量将会相当于600-700个核弹头。”虽然如此，到1974年6月，美国终于愿意向伊朗销售核反应堆，但是，如另一份备忘指出的，“除常规控制之外加入特别的双边控制”国际安保措施。这些安保措施在美国官员的心目中之所以必要，不但出于对国王意图的考量，也出于对“不稳定局势、国内异见分子或者外国恐怖分子可能轻而易举地取得储存在伊朗的特殊核材料制造核弹”的考量。
在国王乐意考虑部分安保措施的时候，他也坚持伊朗不能受到与其他国家不同的对待。其时，伊朗已经与德国法国的公司签署了四个核电站的意向书，而且国王也发出信号计划另从美国获得八个。美国国务院不仅热衷销售这些反应堆，而且甚至鼓励贝克特尔公司说服国王投资3亿美元在美国搞一个合资的铀浓缩设施。这些建议都以国王愿意接受更为严格的鈈加工控制为基础——属于美国的特别关切。尽管渴望作出这样的保证，国王还是断然拒绝了允许美国有权否定对美国提供的燃料进行再加工的主张。
由于这些问题的谈判旷日持久，看来似乎是陷入了僵局，而且国王对美国享有任何否决权都寸步不让，于是国防部建议美国重新审议它的强硬路线的方式并接受国王的要求。五角大楼官员就其关切写道，国王对这个问题函带的威胁不满，认为它“毒害了美伊关系的其他方面”。基于德国法国都巴不得向国王销售美国拿住不放的东西，以及国王明确表示与印度合作搞伊朗核计划的事实，使得美国重新考虑自己地位的形势变得更为迫切。杰拉尔德·福特总统以及他的后任吉米·卡特总统，都同意向国王作出调节，但仍然止于美国对核扩散的关切得到保证。最终在卡特任内，国王愿意作出某种让步证明他并非想要核弹——诸如放弃建造鈈加工厂的计划等——而总统则于1978年允许美国公司向伊朗销售反应堆。
但就在此时，伊朗内部政治动乱的迹象已经在德黑兰初现端倪。在这个协议决定性的数月里，国王穷于应对不断发展的内部骚乱，不能脱身关注核谈判。国王的优柔寡断，其结果与国王犹豫不决的性格造成的对抗击癌症的医疗方案的选择的结果一样，都于事无补。再加上卡特行政当局没能制定对伊朗的令人信服的政策，结果是助推了革命的神职人员的兴起以及伊斯兰共和国的建立。
而当阿亚图拉**鲁霍拉·霍梅尼甫一上台，就下令停止一切伊朗的核计划的工作，批评国王竟然从事这样的项目。数年之后，霍梅尼改变了主意，但其时西方对伊朗的意图更加不信任。真正的突破是在2002年，西方知道伊朗在纳坦兹建立了一个铀浓缩设施，能够覆盖5万部串接的离心机，而且强硬路线的伊斯兰革命卫队越来越多地掌握了伊朗核计划（及其经济与政治）。
不幸的是，从那时起美国的反应激发了某种歇斯底里指控，假定它在核问题上的虚伪。没有清楚地昭告伊朗人民，一个民主、守法的政府本可以以少得多的代价轻而易举地赢得核不扩散条约保障的铀浓缩的权力——没有鼓励反复声明伊朗不需要核武器的伊朗的民主派人士——美国采取了不切实际的最后通牒，而且一次又一次改变自己的路线，使得伊朗现政权误判美国的态度并建立起自己的核现实。

供图：法新社/盖提图片社

*阿巴斯·米拉尼是斯坦福大学伊朗研究的主管，他在那里的胡佛研究所共同主持伊朗民主项目。本文节自他写的《伊朗国王》一书。
**阿亚图拉：伊斯兰教什叶派高级宗教职称。

原文：

BY ABBAS MILANI | DECEMBER 29, 2010

Of the many inaccuracies and obfuscations of the Iranian nuclear negotiations, one of the most persistent has been the claim that, in questioning the ultimate goals of the Islamic Republic's nuclear program, the West is seeking to enforce a duplicitous double standard. According to this line of rhetoric, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Iran, was a Western ally -- or, in the language of the regime, a "lackey" -- and thus America and Europe were willing and eager to help him get not one, but many, reactors. But since the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, these critics allege, Iran is being singled out and persecuted. In 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told Der Spiegel, "It's interesting to note that European nations wanted to allow the shah's dictatorship the use of nuclear technology.… Yet those nations were willing to supply it with nuclear technology. Ever since the Islamic Republic has existed, however, these powers have been opposed to it."

Even some progressive intellectuals in the West have bought into this story, either supporting the regime's program or at least criticizing the U.S. stance on Ahmadinejad's current program as hypocritical given its past lenience toward the shah. The U.S. government itself, in what must be considered an inexplicable failure of public diplomacy, has never challenged this narrative -- although it has access to hundreds of pages of documents that disprove the regime's allegations.
In fact, Washington was involved in a long-standing and frequently behind-the-scenes diplomatic tussle with the shah over the purpose of his nuclear program. Recently declassified documents from the Carter and Ford presidential libraries; the departments of defense, energy, and state; and the National Security Council (NSC) show that every element of today's impasse between the U.S. government and the Islamic Republic was also present in the negotiations with the shah. These range from Iran's insistence on its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) right to a "full fuel cycle," its complaint that the United States was singling it out for guarantees no other country was required to give, and finally the U.S. offer to make Iran part of an international consortium to enrich uranium outside Iran, the so-called "Russian solution." The shah repeatedly insisted that at least he did not want a nuclear bomb -- yet he was adamant that Iran not be treated as a second-class citizen.These negotiations, details of which have not been published before now, don't just expose the regime's lies about the alleged U.S. double standard, they also offer a useful guide for Western negotiators in navigating the waters of Iranian nationalism, both real and feigned.
Iran's nuclear program began in 1959 with a small reactor given by the United States to Tehran University as part of the "Atoms for Peace" program announced by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in December 1953. But that only whetted the Iranian monarch's appetite: With his increased oil revenues, and with his new vision of Iran as the hegemonic force in the region, a nuclear program became for Shah Pahlavi the symbol of progress and power. He summoned Akbar Etemad, a trained nuclear physicist, to the royal court in 1973, told him of his desire to launch a nuclear program, and asked Etemad to develop a master plan.
Two weeks later, the shah met with Etemad again. He quickly read the 13-page draft document Etemad had prepared, then turned to the prime minister and ordered him to fund what turned out be one of the most expensive projects undertaken by his regime. There was no prior discussion in the Majlis, where the constitutional power of the purse lay, or in any other governmental body or council. Like every major policy decision in those days, it was a one-man act. Thus was launched Iran's nuclear program.
The shah's plans called for a "full-fledged nuclear power industry" with the capacity to produce 23,000 megawatts of electricity. By 1977, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) had more than 1,500 employees (who were, on the shah's orders, allowed to become the highest-paid government employees). Pahlavi had arranged for the training of Iranian nuclear experts around the world (including a $20 million endowment at MIT), engaged in an intensive search for uranium mines in Iran and all over the planet, and launched several nuclear research centers across the country. AEOI was in those days one of the most heavily funded programs in the country. In 1976, its budget was $1.3 billion, making it, after the country's oil company, the single biggest public economic institution in the country.
While Germany and France showed immediate eagerness to sell Iran its desired reactors, the United States was initially reluctant to sell any, "without conditions limiting [the shah's] freedom of action," according to the text of a U.S. governmental memo. The German company Kraftwerk signed the first agreement to build the now-famous Bushehr reactor with an initial completion date of 1981 and an estimated cost of $3 billion. As Bushehr was located in a dangerous zone that was prone to frequent and strong seismic activity, extra funds were set aside to protect the site against the dangers of an earthquake. It was said at the time that the German government was so eager to find a foothold in the Iranian market that it guaranteed Kraftwerk's investment against any loss. U.S. companies, on the other hand, were barred from these contracts until Washington's concerns about the shah's intentions were addressed.
The shah was adamant that Iran should enjoy its "full rights," as he put it at the time, within the NPT -- an agreement Iran had immediately signed upon its formulation and that calls for non-nuclear states to forfeit the search for a nuclear bomb in return for easy access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But Iran not only insisted on the right to have the full fuel cycle, it also was interested in processing plutonium -- a faster way to a nuclear bomb than enriched uranium.
In remarks that echo Ahmadinejad's provocative boasts today, in February 1974, following a Franco-Iranian agreement to cooperate on uranium enrichment, the shah told Le Monde that one day "sooner than is believed," Iran would be "in possession of a nuclear bomb." The shah's surprising comment was at least partially in response to the 1974 Indian test of a nuclear weapon.
Realizing the repercussions of his comment, the shah ordered the Iranian Embassy in France to issue a statement declaring that stories about his plan to develop a bomb were "totally invented and without any basis whatsoever." The U.S. Embassy in Tehran, conveying the shah's message, reassured the State Department that he was "certainly not yet" thinking about leaving the NPT or joining the nuclear club.
But even as he was trying to reassure Washington of his intentions, the shah did indicate that, should any country in the region develop the nuclear bomb, then "perhaps the national interests of any country at all would demand that it would do the same," according to the text of discussions with the U.S. ambassador. Assadollah Alam, the shah's court minister, claimed more than once in the journalshe kept from the early 1970s until his death that, in his view, the shah "wanted the bomb" but found it expedient to adamantly deny any such intent at the moment.
According to Defense and Energy departmentmemos from the time, the United States was particularly worried that "the annual plutonium production from the planned 23,000 MW Iranian nuclear power program will be equivalent to 600-700 warheads." Nonetheless, by June 1974, the United States was finally willing to sell Iran nuclear reactors but only after, as another U.S. memo put it, "incorporating special bilateral controls in addition to the usual" international safeguards. These safeguards were, in the mind of U.S. officials, necessary not just because of concerns about the shah's intentions but because "in a situation of instability, domestic dissidents or foreign terrorists might easily be able to seize any special nuclear materials stored in Iran for use in a bomb." www.ufoao.com
While the shah was willing to consider some of these safeguards, he was insistent that Iran not be treated differently from any other country. By then, Iran had already signed letters of intent with German and French companies for four nuclear power plants, and the shah had signaled his plan to procure eight more from the United States. The State Department not only favored the sale of these reactors but even encouraged the Bechtel Corporation to convince the shah to invest up to $300 million in a jointly owned uranium enrichment facility in the United States. These proposals were all predicated on the shah's willingness to accept more rigorous controls over plutonium processing -- something that was of particular concern to the United States. Although eager to offer such assurances, the shah flatly rejected the idea of affording the Americans a veto on reprocessing of U.S.-supplied fuel.
As negotiations on these issues lingered, seeming to reach an impasse, and the shah held firm to his rejection of any U.S. veto right, the Defense Department recommended that the United States reconsider its hard-line approach and accept the shah's demands. Pentagon officials wrote about their concern that the shah's unhappiness over this issue carried the threat "of poisoning other aspects of U.S.-Iran relations." The fact that France and Germany were more than happy to sell to the shah what the United States was withholding, and the fact that the shah had made clear gestures of possible cooperation with India on Iran's nuclear program, made the case for a U.S. reconsideration of its position more urgent. President Gerald Ford, and later his successor Jimmy Carter, agreed to accommodate the shah, but still only to the extent that U.S. proliferation concerns were met. Under Carter, finally, the shah was willing to make the kinds of concessions that proved he wasn't seeking a bomb -- such as forgoing plans for plutonium processing plants -- and the president permitted U.S. companies to sell reactors to Iran in 1978.
But by this point, the first hints of internal political trouble had already appeared on the horizon in Tehran. Within months of this crucial agreement, the shah was too preoccupied with the evolving domestic crisis to pay much attention to the nuclear negotiations. The shah's vacillations, as much the result of his indecisive character as of the medications he was taking to fight the onset of cancer, combined with the Carter administration's failure to develop a cogent policy on Iran, helped enable the rise of the revolutionary clerics and the establishment of the Islamic Republic.

No sooner had Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini come to power than he ordered all work on Iran's nuclear program stopped, criticizing the shah for ever pursuing such a program. Within a few years, Khomeini changed his mind, but by then the West was much more distrustful of Iran's intentions. The real break came when the West learned in 2002 that the Iranians had built at Natanz an enrichment facility with the capacity to house a cascade of 50,000 centrifuges and that the hard-line Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps was increasingly in charge of the country's nuclear program (as well as its economy and politics).

Unfortunately, the U.S. response since then has enabled the kind of hysterical accusations lodged against it for supposed nuclear hypocrisy. Instead of making it clear to the people of Iran that a democratic, law-abiding government could have easily, and at much less cost, achieved the enrichment rights guaranteed under the NPT -- and instead of encouraging Iranian democrats who have repeatedly declared their opposition to a nuclear bomb for Iran -- the United States has offered unrealistic ultimatums and changed its course again and again, allowing the regime to mischaracterize America's approach and create its own nuclear reality.

AFP/Getty Images

Abbas Milani is director of Iranian studies at Stanford University, where he co-directs the Iran Democracy Project at the Hoover Institution.

Adapted from The Shah by Abbas Milani. Copyright © 2011 by the author and reprinted with permission from Palgrave Macmillan, a division of MacMillan Publishers Limited.